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org.mariadb.jdbc/mariadb-java-client: MariaDB Connector/J: Denial of Service via integer truncation in length handling

org.mariadb.jdbc/mariadb-java-client: MariaDB Connector/J: Denial of Service via malformed authentication response

org.mariadb.jdbc/mariadb-java-client: MariaDB Connector/J: Denial of Service via unvalidated packet lengths

org.mariadb.jdbc/mariadb-java-client: mariadb-java-client: Denial of Service via uncontrolled memory allocation

org.mariadb.jdbc/mariadb-java-client: MariaDB Connector/J: Information disclosure via bypass of local file validation

pypdf: pypdf: Denial of Service via crafted cross-reference streams

pypdf: pypdf: Denial of Service via forged page count in encrypted PDFs

pypdf: pypdf: Denial of Service via crafted invalid PDF dictionary

pypdf: pypdf: Denial of Service via crafted PDF page labels

pypdf: pypdf: Denial of Service via infinite loop during dictionary cloning

pypdf: pypdf: Denial of Service via excessive memory consumption during PDF parsing

pypdf: pypdf: Denial of Service via infinite loop on crafted incomplete PDF

pyasn1: pyasn1: Denial of Service via quadratic complexity in binary REAL decoding

pyasn1: pyasn1: Denial of Service via constructed bit string decoding

pyasn1: pyasn1: Denial of Service via quadratic processing of fragmented ASN.1 data

pyasn1: pyasn1: Denial of Service via hash collisions in schemaless decoding

phpunit/phpunit: PHPUnit: Arbitrary code execution via predictable temporary directory usage

node-forge: node-forge: Denial of Service via nested ASN.1 BIT STRING decoding

### Summary `asn1.fromDer()` decodes the contents of BIT STRINGs as ASN.1 by default. That decode ignored the `maxDepth` recursion limit (an incomplete fix of CVE-2025-66031) and also decoded nested BIT STRINGs, keeping a full copy of the decoded contents at each level, so small crafted DER or PEM inputs (certificates, keys, PKCS structures) use excessive CPU time and memory and can abort the Node.js process. Fixed in node-forge 1.4.1. ### Details `asn1.fromDer()` attempts…

node-forge: node-forge: Server or client impersonation via improper handling of deprecated certificate extensions

node-forge: node-forge: Certificate validation bypass via unenforced path length constraints

### Summary `forge.pki.verifyCertificateChain()` enforces the `pathLenConstraint` of a CA certificate's `basicConstraints` extension only when that certificate also has a `keyUsage` extension. For a CA certificate with a `pathLenConstraint` and no `keyUsage`, chains with more intermediate CA certificates below it than the constraint allows are accepted. Fixed in node-forge 1.4.1. ### Details In `pki.verifyCertificateChain()` (`lib/x509.js`), the path length check for a CA…

node-forge: node-forge: Denial of Service via interleaved record during fragmented TLS handshake

node-forge: node-forge: Denial of Service via call stack exhaustion in TLS record processing

node-forge: node-forge: Cryptographic authentication bypass via unvalidated AES-GCM tag length

node-forge: node-forge: Integrity verification bypass via zero iteration count in PKCS#12 handling

node-forge: node-forge: Denial of Service via infinite loop on negative input

node-forge: node-forge: Denial of Service via trusted certificate removal during chain verification

node-forge: node-forge: Denial of Service via inefficient regular expression in PEM decoding

node-forge: node-forge: Denial of Service via missing TLS server certificate

node-forge: node-forge: Prototype pollution via crafted HTTP cookie headers

node-forge: node-forge: Data integrity failure via improper PKCS#7 padding validation

### Summary `decipher.finish()` in CBC and ECB mode accepted malformed PKCS#7 padding: only the last byte was checked, against a limit of four blocks, so mismatched padding bytes, a zero count and oversized counts were accepted and up to four blocks of plaintext could be silently removed. Fixed in node-forge 1.4.1. ### Details `modes.cbc.prototype.unpad()` and `modes.ecb.prototype.unpad()` in `lib/cipherModes.js` read the last decrypted byte as the PKCS#7 padding count…